




By Robert Gaudet, Jr.
Looking back to the Clarence Thomas confir-
mation hearings, one must reconsider the entire nomination
process—from Thomas's laments of "high-tech lynching"
to senators' frustrations with his evasiveness, in order to
make sense of deliberations that seemed "out of control"
(Senators A19) to most Americans. An examination of
past nominations can also help us answer the questions,
"What was wrong with the confirmation picture?" and
"Whose fault was it?" The Senate, that white monolith of
indifference, suffered from a damaged reputation as much
as Anita Hill or Clarence Thomas. The only winner, it
appears, is President George Bush. Bush and the Re-
publican Party got their man confirmed.
The Senate suffered on multiple counts. First, as
Senator Edward Kennedy stated, a "tidal wave of anger
among the women of America" (Other) erupted upon the
discovery that little had been done, originally, to inves-
tigate Anita Hill's sexual harassment charges. This
reinforced the Senate's image of white male insensitivity.
Second, the Senate was not nearly as charismatic or
photogenic for Clarence Thomas as during the Gulf War
debates:
For every occasion when a Senator seemed to be
pressing to understand the truth, there were two
or three more when a lawmaker came across as
a self-important windbag. (Senate's A20)
For all their persistence, senators have the
darndest time getting a nominee to answer their questions.
Like a military strategist, Thomas pulled out all the
moves: coached by the Commander-in-Chief's Admin-
istration, he evaded questions on his personal beliefs,
retreated from potentially damaging thoughts he held in
the past, and went on the attack against senators for
making a circus of the hearings. During the David Souter
hearings, senators had difficulty extracting a response
from Souter concerning abortion rights. The complete
lack of candor directing many candidate's responses
seems to violate the intent of the hearings, yet also appears
necessary forwinning approval. Senator George Mitchell
observed
it is now widely believed that a nominee who
agrees with the President on abortion and is
willing to say so cannot be confirmed [and, as a
result,] with each nomination the process has
become more elaborate and less informative.
(Excerpts A18)
While Senator Byrd expressed distaste for
Thomas's "stonewalling the committee" (A18), no senator
was able to penetrate the rhetorical wall that Thomas and
the Administration built to hide Thomas's personal ide-
ology. Since the President undoubtedly chooses his
nominees on the basis of the nominee's personal beliefs,
the Senate should be allowed the same considerations in
deciding confirmation. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
MA) was frustrated by Rehnquist's evasiveness in the
1986 hearings, proclaiming
it is historical nonsense to suggest that all the
Senate has to do is to check the nominee's IQ, be
sure he has a law degree and no arrests, and
rubber stamp the President's choice. (Mason 8)
No matter what Senators Byrd and Kennedy may feel,
nominees will probably continue stonewalling their Sen-
ate questioners. And to make Thomas's confirmation
matters worse, our Senate lacked control. Described by
the New York Times as being "as raw as it gets" (Senate's
Al), the confirmation debate pitted senator against sena-
tor.
Like Thomas, Justice William H. Rehnquist
claimed an ability to reject his past, when questioned in
The Senate, that white monolith
of indifference, suffered from a
damaged reputation as much as
Anita Hill or Clarence Thomas.
1971 hearings for Associate Justice: "My fundamental
commitment, if I am confirmed, will be to totally disre-
gard my own personal belief." (Mason 5) If this remark
was intended to comfort any senator's fears, it must have
worked; Rehnquist was approved 68-to-26 in a contested
confirmation process. In his 1986 confirmation hearings
for the vacated Chief Justice seat, Rehnquist, like Thomas,
was also targeted with unproven allegations (of intimi-
dating Phoenix voters in 1962and 1964 as a worker for the
Republican Party), but he too denied the charges. Senator
William Cohen's (R-ME) feelings about Hill's accusa-
tions may illuminate the thoughts of senators' deliberat-
ing accusations against Rehnquist in 1986:
Helvidius
[to] allow doubt itself sown by a single indi-
vidual to be reason for rejecting a nominee
[would] set in motion a process that holds the
potential for undermining or destroying any
nominee for public office. (Senators A19)
Thus, unproven doubts should not block confirmation—
our ideal of innocent until proven guilty. Thomas's
opponents reasonedjust the opposite; if there is any doubt
concerning Thomas, they would err on the side of caution
by rejecting his nomination rather than risk placing a
"pornographilic" sexual harasser on our nation's most
venerable Court.
The nomination process of filling vacant Supreme
Court seats can be likened to a game between the Presi-
dent and the Senate, with rules established by Article II,
Section Two of the United States Constitution:
The President...shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint...Judges of the supreme Court.
The Senate's "Consent" is apparently obliga-
tory, but whatever happened to "Advice"? By requesting
the Senate's advice on nominations, the President could
reduce the chances of an embattled process and eliminate
the risk of his candidate's rejection. President Richard M.
Nixon struck out twice with Clement Haynsworth and G.
Harrold Carswell before finally nominating a successful
candidate, Harry A. Blackmun, in
1970. Haynsworth and Carswell
are not alone: of 141 Supreme
Court nominations between 1789
and 1986, 26 were not approved
(12 confirmed nominees declined
to serve). (Mason 8) A politically-
empowered President like Bush or
Reagan may choose to push his
nominees through the Senate, re-
gardless of the risk. Even so,
Reagan's first two nominees,
Robert Bork and Douglas
Ginsburg, were not confirmed.
Since Bush, like Taft, Franklin
Roosevelt, Nixon, and Reagan,
knows that Court appointments
effectively extend a President's
ideology beyond the four-year
term, he chooses nominees that fit
the conservative Bush mold. Vice-
Dean of the Columbia School of
Law Vivian Berger says "Bush
should stop daring God" with
controversial appointments and
refrain from deliberate "court-packing" of conservative
ideology. (Professors 6) Both the President and the
Senate are aware that the nomination process is not a one-
shot deal, but rather an attempt to fill a vacated seat. The
entire process of nomination and rejection could theo-
retically go on forever.
But doesn't anyone care about qualifications?
Critics charged Thomas with being underqualified, and
even the American Bar Association refrained from mark-
ing Thomas "highly qualified"—not a good sign for a
Since the President undoubtedly
chooses his nominees on the basis
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Supreme Court nominee. Qualifications are usually based
upon the American Bar Association's scores of the can-
didate in conjunction with the nominee's published Law
Review articles and literary contributions, and the length
of his or her judgeship. According to Senator George
Mitchell:
Fall 1991
Judge Thomas is not the best qualified American
to be on the Supreme Court, as claimed by the
President. Judge Thomas is not the best quali-
fied African-American to be on the Supreme
Court. (Excerpts A18)
Then perhaps the President should only offer perfect
nominees, such as "senior politicians...or widely admired
judges" (The Week in Review, K) in order to reduce
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confirmation difficulties; a highly-qualified candidate
would offer one less sticking point. Exogenous effects
such as the President's popularity, and whether or not the
party that dominates Congress is the party of the President,
may provide further ground-rules in the nomination game
of qualifications, confirmations, and rejections.
While it is possible to create a smoother confir-
mation process, disagreement may be desirable. Accord-
ing to Phillipa Strum, CUNY Graduate Center political
science professor:
TheJudicary Committee and the Senate become
arenas in which political differences are ex-
pressed, sometimes bitterly. Lack of disagree-
ment may indicate only that the nominee has
views that are largely unknown. (Senate, Edi-
torials/Letters)
The "political differences" engage debate
over the nominee's merits. Mr. Strum offers
the confirmation hearings of Louis D.
Brandeis (which lasted for six months up till
his 47-to-22 confirmation) as evidence that
the inherent problems lie in a
committee that is unable or unwill-
ing to ask nominees and witnesses
the right questions and to insist on
answers, and in a President who
cynically chooses a nominee so far
from the best. (Senate, Editorials/
Letters)
Others believe that politics should not be a
consideration in the confirmation hearings, but rather that
senators should rely on their own best judgement—
regardless of public opinion polls for their states. Senator
Harry Reid (D-NE) chose to disregard the immediate
politics of his constituency:
The polls in my state heavily favored him; every
newspaper in my state editorialized for him.
From a political standpoint, I badly wanted to
vote for Clarence Thomas. However, my con-
science wouldn't let me do it (Senators A19)
While Senator Reid raises the question of politics within
the Senate, other critics have charged President Bush with
wrongly emphasizing political idealogy over qualifica-
tion. Senator Mikulski complained:
the Administration and their senators made a
decision to treat the nomination of Clarence
Thomas as a political campaign and not a
nomination process...[They attempted to] mask
the convictions and obscure the beliefs of Judge
Thomas. He himselfrefused to answer questions
or gave answers that were simply, plainly un-
believable. (Excerpts A18)
Senator Mikulski, one of three women in the Senate, was
outraged with both the perceived insincerity of the nominee
and the political motivations (neither of which was new to
the Thomas hearings) that marked the confirmation pro-
cess.
Beginning with Rehnquist's 1986 nomination,
and erupting in Bork's hearings, "hesitations
expressed...over close scrutiny of a nominee's judicial
philosophy all but disappeared." (Mason 10) Senators
were not afraid to question Thomas on judicial philoso-
op tee cream
To pick a specific
one woud l&ve the
impression that ive
phy, even though they got no answers. During Bork's
hearings, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights led
the opposition while 2,000 law professors (40 percent of
Helvidius
US faculty) signed a petition for his rejection. (Mason 10)
Thomas was also opposed by the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights, as well a group of black American
The Judiciary Committee and the
Senate become arenas in which
political differences are expressed,
sometimes bitterly. Lack of dis-
agreement may indicate only that
the nominee has views that are
largely unknown.
professors who signed a petition authored by Columbia
Assistant Professor of Political Science Carlton Long and
Vassar Scholar-in-Residence Luke Charles Harris de-
nouncing Thomas's claims of racial persecution during
the hearings. (Professors 1) Thomas's "injection of
racism into these hearings," according to Senator Byrd,
may have been "an attempt to fire the prejudices of race
hatred [and] shift [the hearing] to a matter of race."
(Justice) According to Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-
MD), Thomas's "backers and handlers" wanted "to win at
all costs." (Excerpts A18)
Whether or not they supported Thomas (most
did), many Americans are trying to keep hope alive with
thoughts that Thomas may not turn out to be so bad after
all. Senator Bill Bradley praised Thomas for treating
Anita Hill with "the greatest respect during the hearings,"
noting that Thomas was "considerate when he spoke of
her amidst the anger that he spewed at the committee."
(Justice A24) A16 October New York Times editorial also
praised Thomas's "restraint," saying that "there is reason
to hope, after the pain and after the joy, for civility,
precision, and justice." Even during the proceedings,
Americans hoped that a Justice Clarence Thomas might
remember his roots and not destroy decades of civil rights
progress. Senator Exon went so far as to say the hearings
made Thomas a tougher, better person, and hoped that "he
will not turn out to be the doctrinaire idealogue on the
Court that he is projected to be." (Excerpts A18) Once
they are finished hoping, perhaps Americans will nip the
confirmation difficulties in the bud by taking Preseident
Bush to the polls.
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